The Politics of Attention by Hu, Li & Li, Anqi
The Politics of Attention
Lin Hu∗ Anqi Li†
First Draft: July 2018
This Draft: January 2019
Abstract
We develop an equilibrium theory of attention and politics. In an electoral
competition model where candidates have varying policy preferences, we exam-
ine what kinds of political behaviors capture voters’ limited attention and how
this concern affects the overall political outcomes. Following the seminal works
of Downs (1957) and Sims (1998), we assume that voters are rationally inat-
tentive and can process information about the policies at a cost proportional
to entropy reduction. The main finding is an equilibrium phenomenon called
attention- and media-driven extremism, namely as we increase the attention
cost or garble the news technology, a truncated set of the equilibria captures
voters’ attention through enlarging the policy differentials between the varying
types of the candidates. We supplement our analysis with historical accounts,
and discuss its relevance in the new era featured with greater media choices
and distractions, as well as the rise of partisan media and fake news.
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1 Introduction
The 1790’s witnessed the separation of two important figures in the U.S. history:
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. Once closed allies who coauthored the
Federalist papers and shared huge successes in justifying and marketing the U.S.
Constitution, the two figures started to disagree about Hamilton’s economic policies,
which emphasized finance, manufacturing and trade over agriculture. To fight their
war and in particular, to arouse and attract public attention, the two of them founded
political parties and partisan newspapers with extreme and exaggerated positions. To
give a vivid example, while Madison himself believed that a healthy country should
excel in all areas, he urged that people look inwards, to the center of the country, to
farmers, and that they go back to the values that made America great, namely low
taxes, agriculture and less trade (Feldman (2017)).
In this paper, we ask what kinds of political behaviors capture voters’ limited
attention and how this concern affects the overall political outcomes. The premise of
our analysis, as asserted by Downs (1957), is that attention is a scarce resource and its
utilization should be governed by meticulous cost-benefit analysis.1 While descriptive
studies of rational inattentive voters abound, theoretical analysis is lacking, leaving
important questions unanswered. For example, what is the equilibrium effect of
limited attention on policies and voter behaviors? Can the changing market conditions
heatedly debated by the public–such as greater media choices and distractions, the rise
of partisan media and fake news, etc.–partially explain the recent political landscape
through the channel of limited voter attention?
We seek to understand the above described questions in a spatial model of electoral
competition. Inspired by the existing studies on intra-party politics, we assume that
each of the two candidates can have varying preferences for policies, privately known
to themselves, e.g., conservative or liberal left. In particular, we allow such preferences
to depend on the candidate’s winning status, thus ensuring that the equilibrium
policies of the varying types of the candidates can indeed be uncertain from the
voter’s perspective.
1As Anthony Downs famously postulated in An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957): “In
our model, as in real life, political decisions are made when uncertainty exists and information
is obtainable only at a cost. Thus a basic step towards understanding politics is analysis of the
economics of being informed, i.e., the rational utilization of scarce resources to obtain data for
decision-making.”
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In our model, as in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) and Mitchell et al. (2014), at-
tending to politics means taking actions that help reduce policy uncertainties and
make voting decisions. Doing so incurs real and opportunity costs, as the time and
effort required for the processing and absorption of political contents, holding de-
bates and deliberations that facilitate thinking, etc. could be spent elsewhere, such
as work, leisure and entertainment. Following Sims (1998) and Sims (2003), we as-
sume that attention cost is proportional to the mutual information between policies
and voting decisions. It is scaled by a parameter called the marginal attention cost,
which represents cost shifters such as exposures to distractions and media choices,
the competition between firms for consumer eyeballs, etc. (Baum and Kernell (1999);
Prior (2005); Teixeira (2014); Dunaway (2016); Perez (2017)).
Our choice of the attention function seems well-suited for today’s information-rich
world, where a larger body of political information is accessible to ordinary citizens
than ever before. Attention becomes a scarce resource as foreseen by Simon (1971),
and part of it is paid to politics through our regular exposures to a selective yet
wide range of sources (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011); Peterson et al. (2018)). For
the reasons discussed in Section 2.2, we model attention as a selective communication
channel a` la Shannon (1948), whose long-run operating cost is well known to be the
mutual information between the source data and the voting decision. The material of
Appendix A provides further vindications, documenting interesting consequences of
rational, flexible attention allocation, such as selective exposure, confirmatory biases
and seeking big occasional surprises.
Our main finding is an equilibrium phenomenon called attention-driven extremism,
namely as we increase the marginal attention cost, a truncated subset of the equilibria
captures voters’ attention through enlarging the policy differences between the varying
types of the candidates. As demonstrated in Appendices C.3 and C.4, this result
holds true even if (1) policies are multi-dimensional, suggesting that our analysis is
not confined to left-right politics; or if (2) candidates can only partially honor their
policy proposals, which can be regarded as their promises made during the campaign.
It is worth distinguishing our result from the following best-response argument: as
attention becomes costly, voters do not bother to notice the small policy differences
between the varying types of the candidates, hence the latter should push themselves
apart as a means of retaining attention. This argument is incomplete, because it
ignores the equilibrium effects that attention and policies can potentially exert on
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each other. Theorem 1 goes one step further, showing–using robust properties of
the attention function–that under general assumptions about the environment, voter
characteristics, such as marginal attention cost, have no effect on candidates’ winning
probabilities. Thus in equilibrium, marginal attention cost affects only attention
strategies but not policies, and increases in this parameter reduce the set of equilibria
that arouses and attracts attention and raise the needed degree of policy extremism
for achieving this goal.
In our baseline model, as in many existing electoral competition models, candi-
dates care about voters only through the channel of winning probability. In Appendix
C.1, we use visibility as an equilibrium selection device, assuming that the dissemi-
nation of political information involves entities that profit from voters’ eyeballs, e.g.,
revenue-maximizing content providers. Assuming that these entities incur no loss
in equilibrium, we obtain a stronger result: increases in the marginal attention cost
leave us with a truncated set of policy distributions that exhibits a greater degree of
extremism than ever. We discuss supporting evidence in Section 3.4.
In Section 4, we assume that news about candidates is itself a random variable,
and call its probability distribution the news technology. Voters pay costly attention
to news before casting votes. Recently, economists, journalists and political scientists
have voiced concerns for the rise of partisan media and fake news (Levendusky (2013);
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2016); Puglisi and Snyder (2016); Allcott and Gentzkow
(2017)). Following Gentzkow and Shapiro (2016), we model the above described
changes as Blackwell (1953)’s garbling of the news technology and examine their
equilibrium effects through the channel of limited voter attention.
The results appeared in Theorems 2 and 3 are more delicate than their equivalents
in the baseline model. On the one hand, the irrelevance of marginal attention cost to
equilibrium policies remains valid. On the other hand, garbling affects both policies
and attention strategies, and the overall effect can be subtle. The lesson is twofold.
First, any equilibrium that grabs voters’ attention after garbling must exhibit greater
policy differentials than those that fail to do so prior to garbling – a phenomenon we
term as media-driven extremism. Second, in order to back out the extent of garbling
from real-world data, much effort should be spent on the identification of shocks that
affect only attention strategies but not policies, and the attention cost shifters as
discussed in Section 2.2 seem to serve this purpose well.
At a high level, our theory formalizes the role of rationally inattentive voters in
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the overall political landscape, and calls for its rigorous analysis through the equi-
librium channels identified above. Without it, our understandings of certain events
in human history will be deemed incomplete. A famous example dates back to the
1950s, when the conformity in national politics of the United States–hallmarked by
Eisenhower’s embrace of New Deal and the conservative Democrats’ seizure of the
congress–created a sentiment among voters that was best characterized apathy and
indifference. Sensing the pressure from the other side, local candidates exercised in-
creasing caution over time, restricting policy choices to those that pushed the varying
types of themselves far apart and forgoing the remainder that exhibited miniature
differences. According to Campbell et al. (1960), visibility seemed to be the primary
concern, since “In the electoral as a whole where the level of attention is so low, what
the public is exposed to must be highly visible–even stark–if it is to have an impact
on opinion.”
Our result sheds light on how we should interpret voter data. As discussed in
Appendix A.2, a consequence of rational, flexible attention allocation is that the av-
erage propensity one supports the candidate from his own ideological camp can vary
non-monotonically with the marginal attention cost. Once we realize that opinions
and votes are the result of voter paying limited attention to their political surround-
ings, two takeaways are immediate. First, one should not equate measured behaviors
with intrinsic preferences and should instead tease them apart using the methods
proposed and reviewed in Caplin and Dean (2015). Second, in light of the changing
market conditions that affect the attention cost, one should not be too surprised that
the evidence on mass polarization as documented in Fiorina and Abrams (2008) and
Gentzkow (2016) is at best mixed.
1.1 Related Literature
Probabilistic voting models Our candidates have random policy preferences,
and they know the median voter’s position. Thus the main difference between the
probabilistic voting models pioneered by Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985b) is
twofold.2 First, our notion of policy extremism, defined by the policy gap between
the varying types of the same candidate, should not be confused with the policy
2Variations of classical models abound. See, among others, Duggan (2017) for a comprehensive
survey of the theory literature, as well as the textbook of Persson and Tabellini (2000) for applications
to important institutions such as public spending and redistribution.
5
divergence (between different candidates) that probabilistic voting models aim to
produce. Second, our voters act randomly because of limited attention, but they
together impose no aggregate uncertainty on candidates. Thus, factors that affect
the randomness of individual votes, such as marginal attention cost, are irrelevant in
the determination of equilibrium policies, and they should not be regarded as sources
of the aggregate-level voter uncertainty that candidates face in probabilistic voting
models.
Electoral competition with costly information acquisition Several recent
papers introduce costly information acquisition into electoral competition models.3
Mateˇjka and Tabellini (2016) examines a probabilistic voting model with office-
motivated candidates. Unlike our model where policy uncertainty arises from policy
preferences, there voters can reduce the variances of normally distributed random
variables equal to the policies plus exogenous shocks, and the cost of variance reduc-
tion can depend on the candidates’ informational attributes such as transparency and
media coverage. As noted by these authors, their model produces divergence, apart
from other illuminating results, if candidates differ by information attributes. Our
notion of policy extremism differs, and our analysis assumes symmetry.
Yuksel (2014) allows the voters of probabilistic voting models to partially observe
their aggregate preference shock. In the case of single-issued policies, improvements in
the information technology is shown to produce policy divergence through enlarging
the information gap between players.
Prato and Wolton (2016) develops a model of electoral communication in which
paying attention increases the chance that the voter discovers the winning candidate’s
plan once in office. Surprisingly, too much attention can be a curse, because it may
lead incompetent candidates to make inefficient policy choices.
3A common feature of these works is that voters can take actions that affect the uncertainties they
face. This possibility is ruled out by Snyder (1994), Glaeser et al. (2005), Gul and Pesendorfer (2009)
and Aragone`s and Xefteris (2017), in which voters treat the partial observability of the fundamentals
as exogenously given.
One should not confuse such partial observability with the “strategic ambiguity” of the political
messages as studied in Shepsle (1972), Alesina and Cukierman (1990), Callander and Wilson (2008)
and the follow-up works. In the former case, policies are vague because voters lack the capacity
to fully absorb their contents. In the latter case, voters fully absorb the messages announced by
candidates, but messages are only partially revealing of the fundamentals due to reasons such as risk
preferences, asymmetric information and behavioral considerations.
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Incomplete information about candidates’ policy preferences A key element
of our model is a static incomplete information game in which candidates are privately
informed of their policy preferences, and they care about voters through the channel
of winning probability. Private information is modeled as a type that takes finitely
many values, each specifying the candidate’s utility functions in cases where he wins
the election and not. Prior studies such as Banks (1990), Kartik and McAfee (2007),
Callander (2008), Callander and Wilkie (2007) tend to work with specific preference
and information structures, and some of them can be nested by our framework after
careful modifications (more on this later). Nevertheless, we view our games as distinct
ones along other important dimensions, such as whether candidates can take actions
besides setting policies or not.
Rational inattention Early development of the literature on rational inattention
(hereinafter, RI) pioneered by Sims (1998), Sims (2003), Mac´kowiak and Wieder-
holt (2009) and Woodford (2009) sought to explain the stickiness of macroeconomic
variables by entropic information costs. Recently, a great deal of effort by Mate´jka
and McKay (2012), Yang (2015), Yang (2016), Ravid (2017), Martin (2017), etc., has
been devoted to understanding the impact of RI for strategic interactions. A common
thread that runs through these works is the flexibility that pertains to RI attention
allocation. In our case, such flexibility paves the way to sharp equilibrium charac-
terizations, as it ensures that the monotonicity properties of voters’ preferences will
pass seamlessly along to optimal attention strategies. The construction combines the
results of Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) and Yang (2016) with techniques in monotone
comparative statics.
Media Our approach to studying media bias is borrowed from Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2016), and our investigation of its joint effect with limited voter attention is absent
from the existing political models such as Stro¨mberg (2004), Duggan and Martinelli
(2011) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2012). By modeling media as an exogenous tech-
nology, we abstract away from the issue of self-interested media, and we refer the
reader to the handbook chapters of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2016), Puglisi and Snyder
(2016) and Prat (2016) for thorough reviews of the existing literature. Embedding
self-interested media into political models with rationally inattentive voters is the
subject matter of our companion work Hu et al. (2018).
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model
setup; Section 3 conducts equilibrium analysis; Section 4 investigates an extension of
the baseline model; Section 5 concludes. Omitted proofs and supplementary materials
can be found in Appendices A–C.
2 Baseline Model
2.1 Setup
Primitives There is a unit mass of infinitesimal voters and two candidates named α
and β. Each player has a type that affects his valuations of the policies in Θ = [−1, 1],
and the distribution of types is independent across players. In particular, voters’ types
follow a continuous distribution F with full support Θ and zero median, whereas each
candidate c’s type is drawn from a vector space T according to a finite distribution
Pc, c = α, β. In what follows, let t and t˜c denote the type of a typical voter and
candidate c, respectively, and divide the voters into pro-α voters, the median voter
and pro-β voters based on whether their types belong to Θα = [−1, 0), Θ0 = {0} or
Θβ = (0, 1].
Each candidate c has access to the policies in a finite subset Ac of Θc.
4 In the case
where candidate c assumes office and implements policy a, the utility of type t voter,
the winning candidate and the losing candidate is u(a, t), u+(a, tc) and u−(a, t−c),
respectively. The functions u : Θ × Θ → R, u+ : Θ × T → R and u− : Θ × T → R
are continuous in the first argument, and their properties will be further discussed in
Section 3. For now, it is worth noting that our candidates can have office and policy
motivations, both in general forms, as their utilities can depend on who is in charge
and which policy is being implemented.
Election game We add three ingredients to Downs’ (1957) model: random policy
preferences, limited voter attention and noisy news. Time evolves as follows:
1. Nature draws types for players;
2. candidates observe their own types and simultaneously propose policies denoted
by ac, c = α, β;
4This assumption is often stronger than needed, and its role will be commented on after the
statement of Assumption 2.
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3. the press releases news ω about the policy profile a = (aα, aβ);
4. voters attend to politics and vote for one of the candidates;
5. winner is determined by simple majority rule with even tie-breaking and imple-
ments his policy proposal in Stage 2.
Candidate’s strategy Each candidate c’s strategy is σc : supp (Pc)→ ∆(Ac), and
the profile of candidate strategies is σ = (σα, σβ). The policy profile a˜ induced by σ
is a non-degenerate random variable if | supp(σ)| ≥ 2, in which case we simply say
that σ is non-degenerate.
Voter’s problem We make two assumptions about voters. First, voting is ex-
pressive as in most election models, meaning that each voter chooses his preferred
candidate based on the information available.
Second, attending to politics helps voters reduce policy uncertainty and decide
which candidate to choose, and the cost is proportional to the mutual information
between the news and the decision. We motivated this assumption in Section 1 and
will continue to do so in Section 2.2.
The baseline model deals with the benchmark case where news coincides with
the policy profile itself, i.e., ω = a. By Lemma 1 of Mateˇjka and McKay (2015),
we can summarize the decisions of an arbitrary voter t by an attention strategy mt :
Aα×Aβ → [0, 1], wheremt(a) represents the probability that voter t chooses candidate
β under policy profile a. Let
v (a, t) = u (aβ, t)− u (aα, t)
be the voter’s differential utility from choosing candidate β over candidate α under
policy profile a, and let
Vt (mt, σ) =
∑
a∈supp(σ)
mt (a) v (a, t)σ(a)
be the expected differential utility under any given strategy profile (mt, σ). The
voter’s expected payoff is then
Vt (mt, σ)− µ · I (mt, σ) ,
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where the second term of the above expression is the attention cost.
Candidate’s payoff For any policy profile a, define
w (a) =

0 if
∫
mt (a) dF (t) <
1
2
,
1
2
if
∫
mt (a) dF (t) =
1
2
,
1 if
∫
mt (a) dF (t) >
1
2
,
(2.1)
and let wα(a) = 1−w(a) and wβ(a) = w(a) be the winning probability of candidate
α and β, respectively. Let m = (mt)t∈Θ denote the attention strategies of all voters.
Under any strategy profile (m,σ), the expected payoff of candidate c is
Vc(m,σ) = Em,σ
[
wc (a˜)u+
(
a˜c, t˜c
)
+ (1− wc (a˜))u−
(
a˜−c, t˜c
)]
. (2.2)
Equilibrium A strategy profile (m∗, σ∗) constitutes a Bayes Nash equilibrium of
the election game if
1. each m∗t maximizes voter t’s expected payoff, taking σ
∗ as given, i.e., ∀t,
m∗t ∈ arg max
mt:Aα×Aβ→[0,1]
Vt (mt, σ
∗)− µ · I (mt, σ∗) ;
2. each σ∗c maximizes candidate c’s expected payoff, taking m
∗ and σ∗−c as given,
i.e., ∀c,
σ∗c ∈ arg max
σc
Vc
(
m∗, σc, σ∗−c
)
.
Remark 1. In the case where not all feasible policy profiles arise on the equilibrium
path, we adopt the standard refinement in the RI literature that any off-equilibrium
path policy profile can be observed by voters without errors,5 i.e., ∀a /∈ supp (σ∗),
m∗t (a) =
1 if v (a, t) > 0,0 else. (2.3)
As demonstrated later, this assumption plays a minimal role in our qualitative pre-
dictions, and it will be disposed of in Section 4 where news is assumed to be a noisy
5Such best-response arises in the limit as we restrict candidates to adopting totally mixed strate-
gies and take the probability of trembling to zero. See, e.g., Ravid (2017) for further discussions.
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signal drawn from a full-support distribution.
2.2 Rational Inattentive Voters: Part I
Downs’ (1957) thesis has two main elements: attention is costly and attention allo-
cation is rational. Both elements are grounded in reality.
Attention is costly Throughout the analysis, attending to politics means taking
actions that help reduce policy uncertainties and make voting decisions. Examples in-
clude: the processing and absorption of political contents, conversing with colleagues,
family members and friends, and holding debates and deliberations that facilitate
thinking (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011); Mitchell et al. (2014)).
In today’s information-rich world, our attention capacity is rather limited. Among
other things, greater exposures to distractions and media choices seem to have sig-
nificant behavioral impacts, as they have shifted our attention from politics to enter-
tainment, and have lowered the levels of engagement with political contents among
mobile device users (Baum and Kernell (1999); Prior (2005); Teixeira (2014); Dun-
away (2016); Perez (2017)).6
Attention as a selective communication channel The idea that voters focus on
the part of the politics they care most about is not new. A famous example dates back
to the 1950s, when Eisenhower’s differing attitudes towards agriculture and industry
led farmers and laborers to tell different stories about his leadership (Campbell et al.
(1960)). Recent studies of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) and Peterson et al. (2018)
find that people obtain political news through regular exposures to a selective yet
wide range of sources. This suggests that we can model attention as a communication
channel a` la Shannon (1948).
Here is how things work. Imagine there is a myriad of sources, each conveys a bit
of information and together paint a holistic picture of the policies. Every time before
making a decision, the voter visits a number of sources sequentially at a constant
marginal cost, and the problem is repeated for many times. To save costs, the voter
optimizes over the sources based on the decision he wishes to make. For example, if
6For example, Teixeira (2014) estimates that the cost of consumer attention has risen by seven
to nine times in the past two decades. Perez (2017) reports that mobile apps for gaming, messaging,
music and social alone seize up to three hours of U.S. users’ time per day as of 2016.
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the decision is to vote unconditionally for one of the candidates, then no consultation
is needed. If the decision varies significantly with certain aspects of the policies but
not others, then priority should be given to the sources that tell the most relevant
stories. On average, the minimum number of the visited sources is approximately
equal to the mutual information between the source data and the decision, and this
is the famous result of Shannon (1948).
Following Sims (1998) and Sims (2003), we assume the following attention cost
function throughout the analysis:
µ︸︷︷︸
marginal attention cost
· I (mt, σ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mutual information
.
The parameter µ > 0 is called the marginal attention cost and is used to capture
the aforementioned cost shifters. In principle, we could allow this parameter to vary
with the voter’s predisposition, but we choose not to do this, because nothing changes
except when we conduct in-depth analysis of voter behaviors in Appendix A.
The term I (mt, σ) is the mutual information between the policies and the voting
decision, jointly distributed according to (mt, σ). Intuitively, if a voter pays no at-
tention to politics, then the uncertainty he faces can be captured by the entropy of
the policy profile:
H (σ) = −
∑
a∈supp(σ)
σ (a) log σ (a) .
If he gathers information as above, then he has some partial idea about the policies
by the decision-making time. For any given attention strategy mt, let
mt,s =
Eσ [mt (a˜)] if s = β,Eσ [1−mt (a˜)] if s = α,
be the marginal probability that the decision is s = α, β. The residual uncertainty
conditional on the decision being s is then
H (σt (· | s)) = −
∑
a∈supp(σ)
σt (a | s) log σt (a | s) ,
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where
σt (a | s) =

mt (a)σ (a)
mt,β
if s = β,
(1−mt(a))σ (a)
mt,α
if s = α,
is the conditional probability that the policy profile is a, whenever the Bayes’ rule
applies. The reduction in entropy, also termed mutual information:
I (mt, σ) = H (σ)−
∑
s=α,β
mt,sH (σt (· | s))
captures the amount of the time and effort one spends on information processing and
digestion. This term increases as the decision becomes more informed, equaling zero
if the latter is invariant with the policies and H(σ) if it is to always choose one’s
preferred candidate.
Optimal attention strategy The next lemma gives characterizations of optimal
attention strategies:
Lemma 1. For any given profile σ of candidate strategies, the optimal attention
strategy of any voter t uniquely exists. Let mt : Aα × Aβ → [0, 1] be as such, and let
mt = Eσ [mt (a˜)]
be the average probability that voter t chooses candidate β under σ. Then,
(i) if Eσ [exp (v (a˜, t) /µ)] < 1, then mt = 0;
(ii) if Eσ [exp (−v (a˜, t) /µ)] < 1, then mt = 1;
(iii) otherwise mt ∈ (0, 1) and for any a ∈ supp(σ):
mt (a) =
Λt exp
(
v(a,t)
µ
)
Λt exp
(
v(a,t)
µ
)
+ 1
,
where
Λt =
mt
1−mt
is the likelihood that voter t chooses candidate β over candidate α under σ;
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(iv) in Part (iii), mt is strictly increasing in t if the function u has strict increasing
differences in (a, t).
Proof. Parts (i) - (iii) are immediate from Theorem 1 of Mateˇjka and McKay (2015)
and Proposition 2 of Yang (2016). The proof of Part (iv) can be found in Appendix
B.1.
According to Lemma 1, the optimal attention strategy can take two forms, de-
pending on whether the gain from attending to politics justifies the cost or not. In
Parts (i) and (ii), the voter clearly prefers one candidate over another and acts deter-
ministically without paying attention. In Part (iii), the voter has no clear preference
a priori, and the result of him paying attention is a random decision that follows a
shifted logit rule.
A closer look at the solution reveals interesting patterns. First, mt (a) depends
on a only through v (a, t), because distinguishing policy profiles of the same v value
does no good to decision-making but incurs redundant costs.
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5
v
m
(v)
µ
0.02
0.1
Figure 1: Plot optimal attention strategy against v (a, t) for t = −.25: ac is uniformly
distributed on Θc, c = α, β, and u(a, t) = −|t− a|.
Second, the optimal attention strategy, when formulated as a function of v, is
increasing in its argument, hence one should choose a candidate more often as the
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gain increases. This monotonicity property, albeit a simple one, plays an important
role in the upcoming analysis.
Third, optimal attention allocation is selective. While knowing the exact policy
positions wouldn’t hurt had attention been costless, such detailed information is ra-
tionally ignored even in light of an arbitrarily small attention cost. Intead, the focus
becomes on which policy position is more preferable than the other, and the corre-
sponding attention strategy resembles a step function that jumps from zero to one
around v = 0 as depicted in Figure 1.7 As attention cost increases, voters no longer
differentiate the varying positions as much, and the attention strategy flattens out
accordingly.
In Appendix A, we continue the investigation of selective attention allocation,
documenting interesting consequences such as (1) selective exposure, confirmatory
biases and seeking big occasional surprises; as well as (2) the non-monotone varia-
tions of voter behaviors with personal characteristics such as political predisposition
and marginal attention cost. We conclude with discussions of how we should in-
terpret voter data and evaluate the effects of changing market conditions on mass
polarization.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we assume that the environment is symmetric around the median
voter and focus on the symmetric equilibria of the election game:
Assumption 1. The environment satisfies the following properties:
(i) u˜(a, t) = u˜(−a,−t) for all u˜ ∈ {u, u+, u−} and (a, t) ∈ Dom (u˜);
(ii) F (t) = 1− F (−t) for all t ∈ Θ and Pβ(t) = Pα(−t) for all t ∈ T .
Definition 1. A strategy profile (m,σ) is symmetric around the median voter if
(i) σβ (a | t) = σα (−a | −t) for all a ∈ Aβ and t ∈ supp (Pβ);
(ii) mt (−a, a′) = 1−m−t (−a′, a) for all (−a, a′) ∈ Aα × Aβ and t ∈ Θ.
7In the RI literature, “focusing on event E” means clearly distinguishing whether E is true or
not and varying the decision probability accordingly. This is different than the notion of focus as
studied in Nunnari and Za´pal (2018), which means making salient features even more salient.
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The analysis makes the following assumptions about voters’ utility function:
Assumption 2. The function u : Θ×Θ→ R is continuous and satisfies the following
properties:
(i) u (·, t) is strictly increasing on [−1, t] and is strictly decreasing on [t, 1] for all t;
(ii) u(·, t) is concave for all t;
(iii) u(a′, t)− u(a, t) is strictly increasing in t for all a′ > a;
(iv) there exists κ > 0 such that for all t > 0,
min
a∈Aα×Aβ
v (a, t)− v (a, 0) > κt.
All except Part (iv) of Assumption 2 are standard, with Part (iii) asserting that
voters’ utilities exhibit strict increasing differences between policies and types, hence
pro-β voters more prefer pro-β policies to pro-α ones than pro-α voters do. Part
(iv) of Assumption 2 says that all pro-β voters (by symmetry, pro-α voters) value
the policies much differently than the median voter does. Under the assumption
that Ac is a finite subset of Θc, this condition holds true for many standard utility
functions. Notable examples including u(a, t) = −|t − a|, for which κ ≥ 2 minAβ,
and u(a, t) = − (t− a)2, for which κ ≥ 4 minAβ.
The next definition builds on Lemma 1 and will prove useful:8
Definition 2. Under any symmetric profile σ of candidate strategies, a voter t < 0
is said to pay attention to politics if mt ∈ (0, 1), or equivalently
Eσ [exp (v (a˜, t) /µ)] ≥ 1.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: Sections 3.1 presents an
illustrative example; Section 3.2 develops a matrix representation of equilibrium out-
comes; Section 3 conducts equilibrium analysis; Sections 3.4 and 3.5 discuss empirical
evidence and related issues.
8Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we can never have mt = 1, and the other condition for interior
solution Eσ [exp (−v (a˜, t) /µ)] < 1 is automatically satisfied.
16
3.1 An Illustrative Example
The next example illustrates the phenomenon of attention-driven extremism:
Example 1. Each candidate can be of either the centrist type (t = ±tc) or the ex-
treme type (t = ±te) with equal probability, and he can adopt either the centrist posi-
tion (a = ±ac), the moderate position (a = ±am) or the extreme position (a = ±ae).
The winner and loser’s utility function is R − δ+|t − a| and δ−|t − a|, respectively,
where R ≥ 0 represents the office rent, and δ+ and δ− the preference weights on poli-
cies. There are three groups of voters with types t = −τ, 0, τ . Their utility function
is u (a, t) = −|t− a|.
Consider equilibria in which candidates adopt pure, symmetric and non-degenerate
strategies. The last restriction is satisfied by all equilibria of the numerical example
presented below, and it will be disposed of in later sections. Let −a2 < −a1 ≤ 0 ≤
a1 < a2 denote the policies of the varying types of the candidates, each realized with
probability 1/2. A typical policy profile is then aij = (−ai, aj), i, j = 1, 2.
The phenomenon of our interest is composed of two parts:
Part I: equilibrium policies We first characterize equilibrium policies. To this
end, we need to aggregate the decision probabilities across individual voters and
convert the result into winning probabilities.
Consider first the median voter. By symmetry, this voter equally prefers both
candidates on average, i.e.,
m0 =
1
2
,
and an immediate corollary is that he always pays attention to politics. Under any
given policy profile, he chooses the closest candidate to the center most often, so in
particular,
m0 (a21) >
1
2
.
Consider next pro-α and pro-β voters. By Lemma 1 (iv), these voters are more
supportive of the candidates from their own ideological camps, i.e.,
m−τ <
1
2
< mτ .
Had we known their average decision probabilities, we could simply plug them into
the logit rule and back out the decision probabilities under each policy profile. In
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general, this proof strategy does not work well, because solving the average decision
probability has proven to be difficult by the existing RI literature.
To circumvent this challenge, we instead exploit symmetry, as well as the basic
properties of voters’ preferences and attention strategies. To illustrate, consider the
problem of aggregating voters’ decisions under a21:
Step 1 By symmetry, we can convert the problem of aggregating symmetric voters’
decisions under the same policy profile to that of comparing the same voter’s
decisions across symmetric policy profiles:
m−τ (a21) +mτ (a21) = 1−mτ (a12) +mτ (a21)
Step 2 Since the probability that one supports a candidate is increasing in the value
thereof, we can further reduce the above problem to that of comparing a single
voter’s differential utilities across symmetric policy profiles, i.e., by Lemma 1,
sgnmτ (a21)−mτ (a12) = sgn v (a21, τ)− v (a12, τ) .
Step 3 Since voters have concave preferences for policies, it follows that
v (a21, τ)− v (a12, τ) = u (a1, τ) + u (−a1, τ)− [u (a2, τ) + u (−a2, τ)] ≥ 0.
That is, candidate β is more preferred among pro-β voters when he is closer
to the center rather than the other way around.
Combining Steps 1-3, we obtain that
mτ (a21) +m−τ (a21) ≥ 1,
i.e., candidate β is as popular as, if not more so than candidate α is among
pro-α and pro-β voters.
Step 4 Using the median voter to break the tie, i.e., m0 (a21) > 1/2, we find that
candidate β wins the election for sure under a21.
Theorem 1 (i) of Section 3.3 generalizes the above described result, showing that
under any policy profile of any symmetric equilibrium, the closest candidate to the
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center wins for sure, whereas equidistant candidates from the center split the votes
evenly. While limited attention creates uncertainties for individual voters, it imposes
no aggregate-level uncertainty on candidates, for whom the winner is determined the
same as in Downs (1957).9
Part II: voters’ attention Consider next the policies that capture voters’ limited
attention. As discussed earlier, the median voter always pays attention to politics,
whereas the pro-α and pro-β voters do so if and only if
∑
i,j∈{1,2}
1
4
exp (v (aij,−τ)/µ) ≥ 1.
Tedious but straightforward algebra as in the proof of Lemma 3 reduces the above
condition to
a2 − a1 ≥ a term strictly increasing in µ. (3.1)
The message is clear: as marginal attention cost increases, retaining voters’ attention
becomes harder and requires that the varying types of the candidates adopt more
different policies than before.
Attention-driven extremism Figure 2 summarizes our results. Under the as-
sumption that the winning candidate has a stronger policy preference than the losing
candidate does,10 the game has two equilibria as depicted in diamonds, in which the
centrist candidate adopts the centrist position, whereas the extreme candidate adopts
either the moderate position or the extreme position. As demonstrated earlier, fac-
tors that affect the randomness of individual votes, such as marginal attention cost,
are irrelevant in the determination of equilibrium policies.
Meanwhile, the black line depicts the boundary at which pro-α and pro-β voters
9The converse of Step 3 says that when the concavity assumption fails, candidate β can lose the
election despite being closer to the center than candidate α is, thus distinguishing our result from
Downs (1957).
10This assumption is inspired by Calvert (1985a)’s original thesis, which asserts that “Previous
political trades or connections make it necessary to treat the policy concerns of some important
supporters as a constraint on the candidate’s action, who would then behave as though those concerns
were his own.” To us, this suggests that the strength of the policy preference can depend on the
winning status, and that the winner can indeed face more constraints than the loser does. The same
assertion is made by Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007), which essentially assume that
R > 0, δ+ > 0 and δ− = 0.
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are indifferent between (1) paying attention as in the shaded area, and (2) paying
no attention as in the unshaded area. As marginal attention cost increases, this line
moves northwest, causing an expansion of the unshaded area and a contraction of the
shaded area.
When marginal attention cost is low, the right-hand side of Condition (3.1) is close
to zero, hence all equilibria capture all voters’ attention. As attention cost increases,
a truncated subset of the equilibria capture voters’ attention, and those that do so
exhibit a greater degree of policy differential than before. In Section 3.3, we argue
why it makes sense to use visibility as an equilibrium selection device, especially
when the dissemination of political information is costly and involves entities that
profit from voters’ eyeballs. If so, then increases in the marginal attention cost will
leave us with a truncated set of policy distributions that exhibits a greater degree of
extremism than ever. This phenomenon, formalized in Theorem 1 of Section 3.3, is
what we term as attention-driven extremism.
0.01
0.2
0.4
0.01 0.2 0.4
a1
a 2
Equilibrium Policies
Regime Boundary
Attentive
Inattentive
Figure 2: Equilibrium outcomes: ac = .01, am = .2, ae = .4, tc = 0.3, te = 0.8, R = 8,
δ+ = 12 and δ− = 1; regime boundary is drawn for τ = .001 and µ = 10.
Remark 2. We will discuss the following issues after the statement of the main
result: (1) supporting evidence, (2) equilibrium existence, and (3) the roles of policy
preference, finite policy space and attention function in the predictions.
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3.2 Matrix Representation
Let −aN < · · · < −a1 < 0 < a1 < · · · < aN denote the policies of the varying types
of the candidates, where N is an endogenous integer greater than one if not all types
of the same candidate propose the same policy. Let A, Σ and W be square matrices
of order N , and denote their ijth entries by aij, σij and wij, respectively. Assume
throughout that (1) aij = (−ai, aj), σij > 0, σij = σji and wij ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} for all i
and j, and that (2)
∑
i,j σij = 1.
Intuitively, A and Σ compile all policy profiles and their probabilities and will
therefore be referred to as the policy matrix and the probability matrix, respectively.
Likewise, W collects candidate β’s winning probability under each policy profile and
will thus be called the winning probability matrix. To give a few examples, recall
that the probability matrix in the leading example is 1
4
J2, where J2 denotes the 2× 2
matrix of all ones. In the case where policies can be observed by voters without errors
as in Downs (1957), the winning probability matrix is ŴN with ij
th entry being:
ŵij =

0 if i > j,
1
2
if i = j,
1 if i < j.
(3.2)
A tuple [A,Σ,W] can be attained in a symmetric equilibrium of the election
game if (1) [A,Σ] is incentive compatible for the candidates under W (hereinafter,
W-IC), and if (2) W can be rationalized by optimal attention strategies under [A,Σ]
(hereinafter, [A,Σ]-rationalizable). Formally,
Definition 3. [A,Σ] is W-IC if there exists a profile σ of candidate strategies such
that
(i) the probabilities of the policy profiles under σ are given by Σ, i.e.,
σ(aij) = σij ∀i, j;
(ii) each σc maximizes candidate c’s expected payoff, taking the winning probability
matrix W and the strategy σ−c of candidate −c as given, i.e.,
σc ∈ arg max
σ′c
Vc (W, σ
′
c, σ−c) ,
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where Vc (W, σ) can be obtained from plugging W and σ into Equation (2.2).
Definition 4. W is [A,Σ]-rationalizable if
wij = w(aij) ∀i, j,
where w(aij) can be obtained from plugging (mt (aij))t∈Θ under [A,Σ] into Equation
(2.1).
The matrix representation singles out an underpinning assumption, namely candi-
dates care about voters through the channel of winning probability. This assumption
or a slight departure thereof is crucial for the upcoming analysis.
3.3 Analysis
Fix any probability matrix Σ of any order N , as well as any level µ > 0 of marginal
attention cost. Define the set of policy matrices that can be attained in the symmetric
equilibria of the election game by
E (Σ, µ) =
{
A : ∃W s.t. [A,Σ] is W − IC
W is [A,Σ]− rationalizable
}
.
Define the attention set of any voter t < 0 by the policy matrices that induce the
voter to pay attention:
At (Σ, µ) =
{
A : E[A,Σ] [exp (v (a˜, t) /µ)] ≥ 1
}
.
Taking intersection yields the set of policy matrices that captures the voter’s attention
in equilibrium:
EAt (Σ, µ) =
{
A ∈ E (Σ, µ) : E[A,Σ] [exp (v (a˜, t) /µ)] ≥ 1
}
.
The next theorem gives characterizations of these sets:
Theorem 1. Assume Assumptions 1 and 2. Then,
(i) for any probability matrix Σ of any order N , the set E (Σ, µ) is independent of
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µ and is given by
E (Σ) =
{
A : [A,Σ] is ŴN − IC
}
;
(ii) let Σ be any probability matrix of any order N ≥ 2 for which the set E (Σ) is
non-empty. Then for any t < 0 such that v(a, t) > 0 for some a ∈ A ∈ E(Σ),
the following happen as µ grows from zero to infinity:
(a) the set EAt (Σ, µ) shrinks;
(b) min {u (a1, 0)− u (aN , 0) : A ∈ EAt (Σ, µ)} increases;
(c) the objects in Parts (a) and (b) do not always stay constant.
Part (i) of Theorem 1 shows that in every symmetric equilibrium of the election
game, winner is determined the same as in Downs (1957), meaning that under any
given policy profile, the closest candidate to the center wins for sure, whereas equidis-
tant candidates from the center split the votes evenly. Knowing the winning probabil-
ity matrix, voters’ characteristics such as marginal attention cost are irrelevant in the
determination of equilibrium policies. While these characteristics certainly affect in-
dividual voters’ decisions, they impose no aggregate-level uncertainty on candidates,
for whom it is as if policies could be observed by voters without errors.
Part (ii) of Theorem 1 shows that as the marginal attention cost increases, a trun-
cated subset of the equilibria captures voters’ attention through enlarging the policy
difference between the varying types of the candidates than before. Remarkably, this
result holds true for any non-degenerate policy distribution that can arise in equi-
librium, as well as any moderate voter who would occasionally prefer the opposing
candidate in the case where policies could be observed without errors.
At this moment, one may wonder why we as analysts should care about equilib-
rium attention levels. In order to address this question, recall the assumption shared
by our baseline model and many existing models, namely candidates care about vot-
ers only through the channel of winning probability. What is thus ignored is the
practical consideration of visibility, of eyeballs, which is the “fuel of campaign adver-
tising” according to Roger Ailes.11 The stylized model developed in Appendix C.1
11Roger Ailes was the Chairman and CEO of Fox News and Fox Television Stations, from which
he resigned in July 2016. He served as a media consultant for Republican presidents Richard Nixon,
Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, and was an adviser to the Donald Trump campaign.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Ailes.
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formalizes this consideration, assuming that the dissemination of political informa-
tion is costly and non-automatic, and it involves entities such as revenue-maximizing
content providers that profit from voters’ eyeballs.12 In the case where these entities
incur no loss in equilibrium, we obtain a stronger result: increases in the marginal
attention cost leave us with a truncated set of policy distributions that exhibits a
greater degree of extremism than ever. The next section details a few accounts that
support this view.
The two interpretations differ by welfare implications. If we take Theorem 1 at face
value, then increases in the marginal attention cost have no effect on candidates but
make voters worse off.13 If we stick to the second interpretation, then as the marginal
attention cost increases: (1) candidates can be better off if they end up being closer
to their ideal positions; (2) voters can be better off as intuited in Abramowitz (2010)
if the rising policy differential triggers attention and enables more informed decisions.
3.4 Evidence
The conformity in the 1950s During the 1950s, a sense of uniformity pervaded
the American society. Economically, the country experienced marked growth and
prosperity hallmarked by the rapid expansions of the manufacturing and home con-
struction sectors. Politically, the Cold War and fear of communism helped created a
conservative and stable climate, tainted by the quasi-confrontations that slowly got
intensified over time. Accordingly, the United States in 50’s is considered both so-
cially conservative and highly materialistic in nature. Conformity and conservatism
set the social norms of the time.
Among other things, Eisenhower’s embrace of New Deal and the conservative
Democrats’ control of the congress left remarkable footprints on the country’s political
landscape. Fueled by the lack of perceived differences between candidates, the public’s
attitude towards politics was best characterized by apathy and indifference, with
unengaged and uninformed voters spanning through all age groups, ethnicities and
occupations. Based on the National Study of Presidential Elections conducted by the
University of Michigan, Campbell et al. (1960) reports that in 1956, about one fourth
12Berr (2018) reports the “handsome” political ads revenues earned by media companies during
the 2018 midterm election.
13By the envelope theorem, e.g., Milgrom and Segal (2003), a slight increase in µ decreases voter’s
utility by a negative amount.
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of the population demonstrated familiarity with less than one out of the two issues
presented to them. Even among the informed segment of the population, only 40 to
60 percent could articulate the candidates’ positions and answer questions such as
whether a candidate was a conservative left or a liberal left.
According to Campbell et al. (1960), candidates responded, at least at the re-
gional level, to the pressure from the other side. Over time, they imposed increasing
constraints on policy choices, forgoing those with miniature differences and keeping
the remainder that set the varying types of themselves far apart. Visibility seemed to
be the foremost concern here. According to some interviewees, had they been more
permissive and acted the same as before, they could not always cross the threshold of
public awareness, which was vital for the messages to even “reach the newspaper and
dinner tables.” Based on the rich interactions with regional candidates, Campbell et
al. (1960) concludes that “In the electoral as a whole where the level of attention is so
low, what the public is exposed to must be highly visible–even stark–if it is to have
an impact on opinion.”
The above reported case confirms the prediction of Theorem 1. The national
political and economic environment during the Eisenhower era resulted in an increase
in the marginal attention cost. The lack of perceived differences between national-level
candidates created apathy and indifference among the public. To regain the needed
visibility, local candidates exercised caution and deliberation, and the restricted policy
choices exhibited increasing degrees of extremism over time.
Campaign messages In Appendix C.3, we investigate an extension in which the
winning candidate can only partially honor his policy proposal, now regarded as his
promise made during the campaign. The result thereof, namely high attention cost
leads to the selection of extreme and exaggerated campaign messages, is a mere under-
statement of reality. As Roger Ailes once described his role as campaign strategist:“...
eyeball is the fuel and becomes difficult to grab over time... Everything I did, from
issues to speeches to ads to debate rhetorics, was to keep the varying types of the
candidates far apart...” (Popkin (1994); Vavreck (2009)).
3.5 Discussions
Equilibrium existence By Theorem 1 (i), we can solve the equilibrium policies
by considering an augmented finite game, in which candidates’ payoffs depend solely
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on who is closer to the center and what their type realizations and policy positions
are (there are finite of them by assumption). The existence of symmetric (mixed
strategy) equilibria in this game follows from Cheng et al. (2004):14
Corollary 1. Let everything be as in Theorem 1. Then the election game admits
symmetric equilibria.
Policy differential The equilibria of Example 1 exhibit non-trivial degrees of policy
differentials because the winning candidate has a stronger policy preference than the
losing candidate does. Under this assumption, candidates prefer to lose than to win
with undesirable positions and hence are reluctant to move away from their bliss
points.15
To compare and contrast, consider the situations investigated by (1) Downs (1957),
in which R > 0 and δ+ = δ− = 0, and (2) Calvert (1985a), in which R ≥ 0 and
δ+ = δ− > 0. In both cases, the unique equilibrium outcome is (a1, a2) = (ac, ac), in
contrast to what we have in Example 1. The reality may lie somewhere in between
or be even more different,16 which we make no judgment about. The mere goal here
is to clarify the role of policy preference in producing policy differentials.
Attention in the middle Theorem 1 (i) builds on the following lemma, saying
that the middle is always attentive to non-degenerate policy distributions (at a level
that could be arbitrarily low):
14By Harsanyi (1973), mixed strategy equilibria can be viewed as the limit of the pure strategy
equilibria of a perturbed game in which players have private information about their payoffs as in
our model.
15By contrast, the assumption of finite policy space is not as crucial for producing policy differen-
tials, and this can be seen from two angles. First, even in the baseline model, we can have situations
that attain the outcomes of Example 1 in equilibrium even if the policy space is continuous. A
simple (and rather trivial) example would be R = 0, δ− = 0, u+(·, tc) single-peaked at .01 and
u+(·, te) double-peaked at .2 and .4, where the last assumption captures the reality discusseed in
Calvert (1985a) that the winning candidate may have multiple interest groups to serve.
Second, in the extension to noisy news–which, in our opinion, more accurately paints the reality
but is probably too difficult to be studied upfront–the existence of symmetric equilibria follows
from Cheng et al. (2004) in the case where (1) the policy space is compact and convex, and (2)
the news distribution is log-supermodular and is continuous in policy positions. Even so, moving
towards the center is still shown to increase the winning probability, suggesting, once again, that
the policy differential as depicted in Figure 3 should be the result of policy preferences rather than
the topological properties of the policy space. See Example 2 for further discussions.
16For example, Kartik and McAfee (2007) essentially assumes that the candidate is either non-
strategic with δ+ =∞ and t being drawn from a continuous distribution, or is strategic with R > 0
and δ+ = δ− = 0.
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Lemma 2. Assume Assumption 1 and fix any µ > 0. Then in any symmetric equi-
librium in which the policy distribution is non-degenerate, there exists a neighborhood
around the median voter that pays attention to politics.
Proof. The proof exploits symmetry and the fact that exp(−x) + exp(x) > 2 for all
x 6= 0. See Appendix B.2 for further details.
Lemma 2 adds to the on-going debate over whether the middle attends to politics
or not—an issue which we will continue to narrate in Appendix A. Its proof is one of
the few places that exploit the functional form of mutual information, leaving us to
wonder about the validity of Theorem 1 in more general environments.
Alternative attention function The answer to the above question is an affirma-
tive one. Recall the equilibrium construction in Example 1, which has four steps.
Steps 1-3 exploit symmetry and basic monotonicity properties and should thus carry
over to more general settings. To break the tie, we invoke Lemma 2 in Step 4, but
the proof also works if (1) voters have strictly concave preferences for policies, and
(2) some symmetric pair of voters is actively attending to politics. Thus, the only dif-
ference it makes from assuming alternative attention functions is the following: after
the marginal attention cost exceeds a threshold, all voters, including the median one,
could stop paying attention, and candidates best respond to the winning probability
1
2
JN instead. Theorem 1 remains valid beforehand.
Attention set The proof of Theorem 1 (ii) combines Theorem 1 (i) with the fol-
lowing characterization of the attention set:
Lemma 3. Let everything be as in Theorem 1. As µ grows from zero to infinity, the
set At (Σ, µ) satisfies the description of EAt (Σ, µ) in Theorem 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Two things are noteworthy. First, the lemma itself, albeit sounding straightfor-
ward, is not so easy to prove. Second, one should not confuse Theorem 1 (ii) with
this mere lemma, because had equilibrium policies depended on the marginal atten-
tion cost, too, we could arrive at the opposite conclusion: as marginal attention cost
increases, we could end up with more rather than fewer equilibria that grab voters’
attention!
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4 Noisy News
4.1 Setup
In this section, let news be a profile ω = (ωα, ωβ) of reports, each drawn independently
from a finite set Ωc ⊂ Θc according to a probability mass function fc (· | ac). The
joint probability distribution f = fα × fβ has support Ω = Ωα × Ωβ, and it is called
the news technology.
In this modified setting, attention strategy is a mapping mt : Ω → [0, 1], where
each mt (ω) specifies the probability that voter t chooses candidate β under news
profile ω. For any given pair x = (f, σ) of news technology and candidate strategies,
let
νx (ω, t) = Ex [v (a˜, t) | ω]
be the voter’s expected differential utility from choosing candidate β over candidate
α under news profile ω, and let
Vt (mt, x) = Ex [mt (ω˜) νx (ω˜, t)] .
be the expected differential utility under (mt, x). The net payoff is then
Vt (mt, x)− µ · I (mt, x) ,
where I (mt, x) is the mutual information between news and the voting decision.
Under any profile (m,x) of strategies and news technology, the expected payoff of
candidate c is equal to
Vc (m,x) = Em,x
[
wc (ω˜)u+
(
a˜c, t˜c
)
+ (1− wc (ω˜))u−
(
a˜−c, t˜c
)]
.
In the above expression, wc (ω) represents candidate c’s winning probability under
news profile ω and can be obtained from replacing a with ω in Equation (2.1).
4.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Under news technology f , a strategy profile (m∗, σ∗) constitutes a Bayes Nash equilib-
rium of the election game if each player maximizes expected utility, taking f and the
other players’ strategies as given. In what follows, we assume that the environment,
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which now includes the news technology, is symmetric around the median voter:
Assumption 3. fα (−ω | −a) = fβ (ω | a) for all a ∈ Aβ and ω ∈ Ωβ.
Again, we focus on the symmetric equilibria of the election game:
Definition 5. A strategy profile (m,σ) is symmetric around the median voter if
(i) σβ (a | t) = σα (−a | −t) for all a ∈ Aβ and t ∈ supp (Pβ);
(ii) mt (−ω, ω′) = 1−m−t (−ω′, ω) for all (−ω, ω′) ∈ Ω and t ∈ Θ.
The analysis assumes that the news technology is log-supermodular (Milgrom
(1981)), meaning that we are more likely to observe extreme rather than centrist
news reports as the underlying policy becomes more extreme:
Assumption 4. The following holds true for all c, a, a′ ∈ Ac and ω, ω′ ∈ Ωc such
that a < a′ and ω < ω′:
fc (ω
′ | a)
fc (ω | a) <
fc (ω
′ | a′)
fc (ω | a′) .
The next definition extends Definition 2 to encompass noisy news:
Definition 6. Under any symmetric profile x = (f, σ) of news technology and can-
didate strategies, a voter t < 0 is said to pay attention to politics if
Ex [exp (νx (ω˜, t) /µ)] ≥ 1.
4.2.1 Matrix Representation
Let −ωK < · · · < −ω1 < 0 < ω1 < · · · < ωK denote the realizations of news signals,
where K is an exogenous integer greater than one. Write ωmn = (−ωm, ωn) for
m,n = 1, · · · , K. Let A and Σ be as above, and let W be the K ×K matrix whose
mnth entry wmn ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} represents candidate β’s winning probability under news
profile ωmn.
Under news technology f , a tuple 〈A,Σ,W〉 of matrices can be attained in a
symmetric equilibrium of the election game if (1) [A,Σ] is incentive compatible for
the candidates under 〈f,W〉, and if (2) W can be rationalized by optimal atten-
tion strategies under 〈f,A,Σ〉 (hereinafter, 〈f,W〉-IC and 〈f,A,Σ〉-rationalizable,
respectively). Formally,
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Definition 7. [A,Σ] is 〈f,W〉-IC if in Definition 3, the winning probability matrix
is replaced with an N ×N matrix whose ijth entry is
K∑
m,n=1
wmnf (ωmn | aij)σij.
Definition 8. W is 〈f,A,Σ〉-rationalizable if
wmn = w (ωmn) ∀m,n,
where w (ωmn) can be obtained from plugging (mt (ωmn))t∈Θ under 〈f,A,Σ〉 into
Equation (2.1).
4.2.2 Analysis
Equilibrium policies For any pair (Σ, f), define the set of policy matrices that
can be attained in the symmetric equilibria of the election game by
E (Σ, f) =
{
A : ∃W s.t. [A,Σ] is 〈f,W〉 − IC
W is 〈f,A,Σ〉 − rationalizable
}
The next theorem gives a full characterization of this set:
Theorem 2. Assume Assumptions 1-4. Then for any probability matrix Σ of any
order N ≥ 2,17
E (Σ, f) =
{
A : [A,Σ] is 〈f,ŴK〉 − IC
}
.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Theorem 2 shows that in any symmetric equilibrium in which candidates adopt
non-degenerate strategies, winner is determined as if news were fully revealing, mean-
ing that under any news profile, the candidate earning the most centrist news report
wins for sure, whereas those earning equidistant news reports from the center split
the votes evenly.
The implication of Theorem 2 is twofold. First, the key insight of Theorem 1
(i)–namely voters’ characteristics such as marginal attention cost are irrelevant in the
17The case of N = 1 is less interesting: E (Σ, f) = {A : [A,Σ] is 〈f, 12JK〉 − IC}.
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determination of equilibrium policies–remains valid. As before, equilibrium policies
can be solved by considering an augmented game between candidates only, and the
existence of symmetric equilibrium follows from Cheng et al. (2004).18
Second, news technology enters the determination of equilibrium policies, and the
effect is more delicate than what we have seen so far (more details to come).
Attention set For any given pair (Σ, f), define the attention set of an arbitrary
voter t < 0 by
At (Σ, f) =
{
A : E〈f,A,Σ〉
[
exp
(
µ−1ν〈f,A,Σ〉(ω, t)
)] ≥ 1} .
Taking intersection with E (Σ, f) yields the set of policy matrices that draws the
voter’s attention to politics in equilibrium:
EAt (Σ, f) = E (Σ, f) ∩ At (Σ, f) ,
In Appendix C.2, we verify that the above defined sets vary the same with the
marginal attention cost as their equivalents in Theorem 1. Below we examine how
they depend on the informativeness of the news technology.
As in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2016), we adopt Blackwell (1953)’s notion of infor-
mativeness:
Definition 9. f is more Blackwell-informative than f ′ ( f ′ is a garble of f , f  f ′)
if there exists a Markov kenel ρ such that for all a and ω′,
f ′ (ω′ | a) =
∑
ω∈Ω
f (ω | a) ρ (ω′ | ω) .
Since Blackwell (1953), it is well known that garbling destroys information and
makes decision makers worse-off in all decision problems. Recently, economists, jour-
nalists and political scientists have voiced concerns for the rise of partisan media and
fake news (Levendusky (2013); Gentzkow and Shapiro (2016); Puglisi and Snyder
(2016); Allcott and Gentzkow (2017)). We seek to understand how these concerns,
18The same is true when the news distribution is continuous in policy positions and the policy
space is compact and convex, yet we do not state this as a main result in order to keep consistency
with the baseline model.
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modeled as garblings of the news technology, can affect equilibrium outcomes through
the channel of limited voter attention.
We first examine the effect of garbling on the attention set:
Theorem 3. Assume Assumptions 1 and 2. Fix any probability matrix Σ of any
order N ≥ 2, as well as any f  f ′ that satisfy Assumptions 3 and 4. Then for any
t < 0 such that the sets At (Σ, f) and At (Σ, f ′) are different and non-empty,
(i) At (Σ, f ′) ( At (Σ, f);
(ii) min
A∈At(Σ,f ′)
ν〈f ′′,A,Σ〉 (ωK1, 0) > min
A∈At(Σ,f)
ν〈f ′′,A,Σ〉 (ωK1, 0) for f ′′ = f, f ′.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Theorem 3 conveys an intuitive message: as the news technology becomes less
Blackwell-informative, retaining voters’ attention becomes harder and requires that
the policy differential between the varying types of the candidates be greater on
average. To develop intuition, notice that
ν〈f,A,Σ〉 (ωK1, 0) = E〈f,A,Σ〉 [u (a˜β, 0) | ωβ = ω1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
−E〈f,A,Σ〉 [u (a˜β, 0) | ωβ = ωK ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
,
where (1) and (2) is the median voter’s expected valuation of candidate β’s pol-
icy upon hearing the most centrist news report and the most extreme news report,
respectively. Expanding these terms, we obtain
(1) =
∑N
i=1 fβ (ω1 | ai)u(ai, 0)σi∑N
i=1 fβ (ω1 | ai)σi
,
and
(2) =
∑N
i=1 fβ (ωK | ai)u(ai, 0)σi∑N
i=1 fβ (ωK | ai)σi
,
where σi =
∑
j σji is the marginal probability that candidate β’s policy is ai. By log-
supermodularity, we know that (1) weighs centrist policies heavily and (2) extreme
policies heavily. Thus, an enlarging gap between (1) and (2) means that the centrist
and extreme policies have become more different on average, holding probabilities
and the news technology fixed.
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Media-driven extremism The overall effect of garbling is illustrated by the next
example:
Example 2. In Example 1, let the policy spaces Ac’s can be arbitrarily rich, and
suppose the news signals can take either the centrist value (ω = ±ω1) or the extreme
value (ω = ±ω2), 0 < ω1 < ω2 < 1. The news technology is fξ = fα,ξ × fβ,ξ, where
fβ,ξ (ω2 | a) = a + ξ(1 − a) is the probability that we hear the extreme news report
when the policy is a. The parameter ξ ∈ (0, 1) captures the degree of slanting, as
well as the Blackwell-informativeness of the news technology: as ξ increases, we are
more likely to hear extreme news reports, ceteris paribus, and the quality of news
deteriorates.
Consider equilibria in which candidates adopt pure symmetric strategies with
policy realizations −a2 < −a1 < 0 < a1 < a2 (indeed, all equilibria take this form
and hence are strict). Figure 3 depicts the results for three levels of ξ’s. In particular,
the diamonds represent the (a1, a2)’s that can arise in equilibrium, and the lines
represent the boundaries at which voter −.001 is indifferent between paying attention
or not.
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
a1
a
2
ξ
0.3
0.6
0.8
Figure 3: Equilibrium outcomes when tc = 1/4, te = 3/4, R = 8, δ+ = 3 and δ− = 1:
diamonds represent the (a1, a2)’s that can arise in equilibrium when Aβ consists of 50
evenly spaced points in [0, 1]; the shaded areas above the lines represent the attention
sets when τ = .001 and µ = 1.
As ξ increases, the attention set depicted in the shaded area shrinks and moves
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northwest, and the remaining points exhibit a greater degree of policy differential than
before. Equilibrium policies converge to candidates’ bliss points (1/4, 3/4), though the
trajectory can depend subtly on their utility functions and the news technology. As in
Section 3, policy differential arises as a result of candidates’ policy preferences: under
the assumption of log-supermodular news, moving towards the center increases the
winning probability by Theorem 2, suggesting, once again, that the winner must have
a stronger policy preference than the loser does in order to prevent the convergence
to the center from happening.19
Since garbling affects both the attention set and policies, the overall effect is more
subtle than what we have seen so far. Two observations are immediate. First, any
equilibrium that grabs voters’ attention after garbling must exhibit a greater of policy
differential than those failing to do so prior to garbling—a phenomenon we term as
media-driven extremism.
Second, in order to back out the degree of garbling from real-world data, we
need to identify shocks that affect only the attention set but not the policies, or vice
versa. By Theorem 1 and its corollary in Appendix C.2, the attention cost shifters as
discussed in Section 2.2 seem to serve this purpose well.
5 Concluding Remarks
As discussed in Section 3.5, a main prediction of our analysis–which is robust to the
attention function being used–is that equilibrium policies can be solved by consider-
ing an augmented incomplete information game between candidates only. To make
further progress–e.g., prove existence of pure strategy equilibrium, give conditions
for equilibrium uniqueness or multiplicity, provide detailed characterizations–we need
to make additional assumptions about candidates and the news technology, but not
about voters or their attention function. For now, we choose not to pursue this route,
because the exercise is tangential to our focus.
For the same reason, we well acknowledge the possibility of having multiple equi-
libria, and believe that it indeed makes the interpretation of attention- and media-
driven extremism easier rather than harder. In case the reader wishes to conduct
19This feature distinguishes our noisy news from the aggregate shock to voters’ preferences in
probabilistic voting models, as the latter prevents the candidates as in Wittman (1983) and Calvert
(1985a) from moving towards the center.
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equilibrium refinement, he or she can be assured that this exercise–which replaces the
set of equilibrium policies with its subset–leaves our main messages untouched.
Caution should be exercised when extrapolating our results to the study of elite
polarization. First, such exercise commands a holistic characterization of the policy
distribution and requires the same additional assumptions as discussed above. Second,
as noted by Barber and McCarty (2015), there is no necessary logical connection
between polarization and the reduction in the dimensionality of political conflict as
documented in Poole and Rosenthal (2001)—a key element of which is that intra-
party division loses its predictive power of roll-call vote decisions during most of the
twentieth century, only to rebound to the 90 percent level in recent years.
The lesson is twofold. First, a richer model that captures party as a team, career
concerns, etc. is needed for better predicting the outcomes of congressional voting
(see, e.g., Polborn and Snyder (2017) for researches along this line). Second, when
testing the predictive power of our model, much effort should be devoted to the
identification of shocks that affect only the attention cost or the news technology but
not the countervailing factors as laid out in Barber and McCarty (2015).
Finally, it seems plausible to apply our result to the study of industrial organiza-
tion topics, such as product differentiation against rationally inattentive consumers.
We hope someone, maybe ourselves, will pursue this research agenda in the future.
A Rational Inattentive Voters: Part II
A.1 Selective Exposure, Confirmatory Bias and Bit Occa-
sional Surprise
Figure 4 depicts the optimal attention strategies of two voters: t = 0 and t = −.25.
Compared to the median voter t = 0, the pro-α voter t = −.25 more prefers candidate
α than candidate β ceteris paribus. Even in light of an arbitrarily small attention
cost, such predisposition manifests itself through attention allocation, leading the pro-
α voter to focus on whether candidate β is much closer to the center than candidate
α is, but nothing else.20 This shouldn’t come as a surprise, since voters learn most
from occasional surprises that challenge their predispositions when the default is to
20An antecedent of this result appears in Calvert (1985a), showing that biased voters may benefit
most from consulting biased experts when choosing between multiple information sources.
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Figure 4: Plot optimal attention strategies against a for t = 0 and t = −.25: ac is
uniformly distributed on Θc, c = α, β, u(a, t) = −|t− a| and µ = .02.
pay no attention and act based on the ideology.
Outcome-wise, it is as if the pro-α voter selectively exposes himself to some pro-
α media outlet or personalized news aggregator that gathers information from the
sources on his behalf.21 With high probability measured by the area of the dark area,
the recommendation is to choose candidate α, thus exhibiting confirmatory biases
(Lemma 1 (iv) formalizes this observation).22 In the case where the recommendation
is in favor of β, the evidence must be overwhelming in that candidate β is known to
be much closer to the center than candidate α is, hence even the pro-α voter should
act accordingly.23
21We emphasize the role of media outlet as information aggregator rather than information sources,
and further pursue this agenda in our companion paper Hu et al. (2018).
22Confirmatory bias refers to the tendency to search for, interpret, favor and recall information in a
way that confirms one’s preexisting beliefs or hypotheses. The question of whether the consumption
of political news and contents exhibits confirmatory bias has attracted much attention of economists
and political scientists. We refer the reader to Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011), Peterson et al. (2018)
and the references therein for thorough reviews of the literature.
23See Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) and the recent coverage of Fox News for examples of such
recommendations. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) provides justifications based on competition and
reputation concerns. Here and in Hu et al. (2018), they are part of the demand of rationally
inattentive voters.
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t It mt (−.01, .01) mt (−.01, .4) mt (−.4, .01) mt (−.4, .4)
-.2 0 0 0 0 0
-.05 .315 .296 .006 .930 .148
0 .312 .500 .012 .987 .500
Table 1: Attention levels of various voters: policies equal ±.01 and ±.4 with proba-
bility 1/2, u(a, t) = −|t− a| and µ = .09.
A.2 Non-Monotonicity
An intriguing consequence of rational, flexible attention allocation is that voter behav-
iors can vary non-monotonically with their personal characteristics such as political
predisposition and marginal attention cost.24 Below we conduct analysis of attention
levels and decision probabilities, holding the equilibrium policy distribution fixed.
Who pays more attention? Consider first the level of paid attention, measured
by the mutual information between policies and the voting decision. Table 1 compiles
the results of three voters: t = 0, t = .05 and t = .2. The median voter, by definition,
holds a neutral position. While he focuses mainly on whether aα + aβ ≥ 0 or not,
he still distinguishes between the policy profiles within each category when attention
is not too costly. By contrast, voter t = −.2 has a strong predisposition to support
candidate α, whereas voter t = −.05 focuses sharply on whether a = (−.4, . − .01)
or not due to his slight preference for candidate α. In the end, voter t = −.05 pays
most attention, followed by the median voter and then voter t = −.2.
Effect of marginal attention cost Consider next the average propensity to choose
candidate β. Table 2 compiles the result of voter t = −.05, which first increases with
the marginal attention cost and then decreases after the latter reaches a threshold.
Interestingly, what drives this pattern seems to be the flexibility that pertains to, but
is not unique to, RI attention allocation.
As µ increases, the voter garbles his decisions at the varying policy profiles. During
the first phase, the degree of garbling is similar across all policy profiles, meaning that
the pointwise decision probability is inflated if it is initially below the average and is
24Such flexibility pertains to, but is not unique to, RI attention allocation, and similar conclusions
can be drawn for alternative posterior-separable attention functions. The material is available upon
request.
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µ mt mt (−.01, .01) mt (−.01, .4) mt (−.4, .01) mt (−.4, .4)
.01 .261 .046 .000 1 .000
.10 .344 .300 .009 .905 .162
.20 .283 .263 .048 .627 .148
Table 2: Probabilities of choosing candidate β at various levels of µ’s: policies equal
±.01 and ±.4 with probability 1/2, u(a, t) = −|t− a| and t = −.05.
deflated otherwise. Since there are three policy profiles in the former category and
one in the latter category, the average decision probability mechanically increases.
During the second phase, most garbling occurs at the policy profile (−.4, .01) where
the voter would have chosen candidate β under perfect information but does so less
often now. As a result, the average decision probability decreases.
The role of flexibility To facilitate comparison, consider a more stylized setting in
which voters can pay a cost c(I) and fully observe the policy profile with probability
p(I), where p and c are increasing smooth functions defined on R+. For any pro-α
voter, the problem becomes to choose the level (but not the allocation) of attention
that maximizes
p(I) · Eσ [v (a˜, t)]− µ · c (I) .
Under the assumption that u has strict increasing differences in (a, t) and hence
v (a, t) is strictly increasing in t, it is easy to show that It is increasing in t and mt is
decreasing in µ among pro-α voters.
Lessons By now, there is a broad scholarly consensus that extreme voters are ac-
tivists, that they are more attentive to and engaged in politics (Abramowitz (2010)).
Evidence pertaining to the middle is mixed (Barber and McCarty (2015)), with
some asserting that the middle is apathetic, unengaged and uninformed (Abramowitz
(2010)), and others insisting that the antipathy is exaggerated and is a measurement
issue at large (Ahler and Broockman (2018)). Our theory sheds light on this debate.
On the one hand, we can induce high levels of attention among extreme voters by
setting their marginal attention costs low, or by invoking the “refocusing argument”
as provided in the explanation of Table 1. On the other hand, Lemma 2 shows that
in environments like ours, the middle is always attentive, albeit at a level that could
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be arbitrarily low.
The question of whether mass polarization is on the rise has triggered heated
debates among the public. When it comes to measuring polarization, economists
prefer to look at actual votes rather than self-reported political views, because the
former is “Closer to the kind of ‘revealed preference’ measure economists prefer”
(Gentzkow (2016)). Our addition is twofold. First, if measured behaviors are the
result of voters paying limited attention to their political surroundings, then changes
in the information environment per se can already cause variations thereof, even if
the policy distribution is held fixed. Thus, one should not equate measurements
with intrinsic preferences and should instead tease them apart using the methods
proposed and reviewed in Caplin and Dean (2015). Second, in light of the subtle
results presented in Table 2, one should not be too surprised that the evidence on
mass polarization as documented in Fiorina and Abrams (2008) and Gentzkow (2016)
is at best mixed.
B Omitted Proofs
B.1 Proofs of Section 2.2
Proof of Lemma 1 (iv)
Proof. The problem of voter t boils down to choosing the likelihood ratio Λ that
maximizes:
Eσ
v (a˜, t) Λ exp
(
v(a˜,t)
µ
)
Λ exp
(
v(a˜,t)
µ
)
+ 1
− µ · I (Λ, σ) ,
where I (Λ, σ) stands for the mutual information between the policies and the voting
decision. Under Assumption 2 (iv), the above objective function has strict increasing
differences in (Λ, t), and the result follows from Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
B.2 Proofs of Section 3
Define the function γ : R→ R by
γ(x) = exp(x) + exp(−x), (B.1)
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and notice the following properties: (1) γ ≥ 2 and the equality holds at x = 0, (2)
γ′ > 0 on R+, (3) γ′′ > 0, and (4) for any b > 1, the equation γ(x) = 2b has a unique
positive root
γ−1(2b) = log
(
b+
√
b2 − 1
)
(B.2)
In what follows, write
∆ij(t) = µ
−1v (aij, t) , (B.3)
and drop the notation of t in the case of t = 0.
The next lemma is useful for the upcoming analysis:
Lemma 0. Under Assumptions 1 and 2(i), the following hold true for any policy
matrix A of any order N :
(i) ∆ij = −∆ji ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N ;
(ii) ∆ij > 0 ∀i > j;
(iii) ∆N1 = max
i,j
∆ij.
Proof. In the evaluation of v (aij, 0) = u (ai, 0)− u (aj, 0), using the assumption that
u (·, 0) is strictly increasing on [−1, 0], strictly decreasing on [0, 1] and symmetric
around a = 0 gives the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Fix any non-degenerate strategy profile for the candidates. Let [A,Σ] be the
corresponding matrix representation, where A and Σ are square matrices of order
N ≥ 2. By Lemma 0,
E[A,Σ]
[
exp
(
∆˜ij
)]
=
N∑
i=1
σii exp (∆ii) +
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
σijγ (∆ij)
>
N∑
i=1
σii · 1 +
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
σij · 2 = 1,
and E[A,Σ]
[
exp
(
−∆˜ij
)]
> 1, where both inequalities are strict because N ≥ 2. Then
by continuity, the above inequalities are strict in a neighborhood I of t = 0, and the
result follows from Lemma 1.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Let t and Σ be as in Theorem 1. Below we demonstrate that as µ grows from
zero to infinity,
(i) the set At (Σ, µ) shrinks;
(ii) the term min {u(a1, 0)− u(aN , 0) : A ∈ At(Σ, µ)} increases;
(iii) the objects in Parts (i) and (ii) do not always stay constant.
Part (i): Let A be any policy matrix of order N . By optimality, the mutual infor-
mation between the policy profile induced by [A,Σ] and the voter’s optimal decision
is decreasing in µ, and using this fact in the assessment of the set At (Σ, µ) gives the
desired result.
Part (ii): Let A be as above. By Assumption 2 (iii) and (iv),
E[A,Σ]
[
exp
(
∆˜ij(t)
)]
≤ exp (κt/µ)E[A,Σ]
[
exp
(
∆˜ij
)]
,
where the last term of the above inequality can be bounded above as follows:
E[A,Σ]
[
exp
(
∆˜ij
)]
=
N∑
i=1
σii exp (∆ii) +
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
σijγ (∆ij)
≤
N∑
i=1
σii · 1 + 1
2
(
1−
N∑
i=1
σii
)
γ (∆N1) .
Thus, a necessary condition for E[A,Σ]
[
exp
(
∆˜ij (t)
)]
≥ 1 to hold true is
exp(κt/µ)
[
N∑
i=1
σii +
1
2
(
1−
N∑
i=1
σii
)
γ (∆N1)
]
≥ 1,
or equivalently
γ (∆N1) ≥ 2b,
where
b , exp(κ|t|/µ)−
∑N
i=1 σii
1−∑Ni=1 σii > 1.
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Since γ′ > 0 on R+ and the equation γ(x) = 2b has a unique positive root
γ−1(2b) = log
(
b+
√
b2 − 1
)
,
the above necessary condition is equivalent to
u(a1, 0)− u(aN , 0) ≥ µγ−1(2b) , δ(µ).
It is easy to verify that δ(µ) is strictly positive for all µ > 0. Below we demonstrate
that it is strictly increasing in µ:
Step 1 Show that dδ(µ)
dµ
> 0 when µ > κ
2 log 2
. For ease, write y = exp(κ|t|/µ),
z = b+
√
b2 − 1 and Σ = ∑Ni=1 σii. Notice that y, z > 1 and Σ < 1.
Differentiating δ(µ) with respect to µ, we obtain
dδ(µ)
dµ
= log z − y log y
(1− Σ)√b2 − 1 .
Since
log z = log[1 + (z − 1)] ≥ 2(z − 1)
2 + (z − 1) =
2(z − 1)
z + 1
,
and
log y = log[1 + (y − 1)] ≤ (y − 1)√
1 + (y − 1) =
y − 1√
y
,
a sufficient condition for dδ(µ)
dµ
> 0 to hold true is
2(z − 1)
z + 1
−
y · y−1√
y
(1− Σ)√b2 − 1 > 0.
Plugging z = b+
√
b2 − 1 and b = y−Σ
1−Σ into the above inequality and rearranging,
we obtain
2
(
y − 1 +
√
(y − 1)(y + 1− 2Σ)
)√
y + 1− 2Σ
−
(
y + 1− 2Σ) +
√
(y − 1)(y + 1− 2Σ
)√
y(y − 1) > 0.
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This is equivalent to√
(y − 1)(y + 1− 2Σ)
(√
y − 1 +
√
y + 1− 2Σ
)
(2−√y) > 0,
which holds true if and only if 2−√y > 0, or equivalently exp(κ|t|/2µ) < 2. A
sufficient condition is µ > κ
2 log 2
.
Step 2 Show that d
2δ(µ)
dµ2
< 0. Since
d2δ(µ)
dµ2
= − log y√
y + 1− 2Σ
(
1− y(y − Σ)
y + 1− 2Σ
)
dy
dµ
,
a sufficient condition for d
2δ(µ)
dµ2
< 0 to hold true is
1− y(y − Σ)
y + 1− 2Σ < 0,
or equivalently y > 2− 1
Σ
. This is indeed the case since y > 1 and Σ < 1.
Part (iii): When µ ≈ 0, At (Σ, µ) 6= ∅ from the assumption that v (a, t) > 0 for some
a ∈ A ∈ E (Σ). When µ is large,
E[A,Σ]
[
exp
(
∆˜ij(t)
)]
≈︸︷︷︸
(1)
E[A,Σ]
[
1 + ∆˜ij(t)
]
<︸︷︷︸
(2)
E[A,Σ]
[
1 + ∆˜ij
]
= 1,
where (1) uses the fact that exp(z) ≈ 1 + z when z ≈ 0, and (2) Assumption 2 (iii).
Thus At (Σ, µ) = ∅, and this completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Part (i): By symmetry, the following holds true for all i and j:∫
m∗t (aij) dF (t) =
∫
t<0
1−m∗−t (aji) dF (t) +
∫
t>0
m∗t (aij) dF (t)
=
∫
t>0
m∗t (aij)−m∗t (aji) dF (t) +
1
2
.
When N = 1, the result is immediate because the first term of the above line is equal
to zero.
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Suppose N ≥ 2. Below we argue that for all i > j, (1) m∗t (aij) ≥ m∗t (aji) for all
t, and (2) the inequality is strict in a neighborhood of t = 0:
Step 1 Since the function u(·, t) is concave and hence the function u(·, t) + u(−·, t)
is decreasing in its argument, the following holds true for all t:
v (aij, t)− v (aji, t) = u (aj, t) + u (−aj, t)− [u (ai, t) + u (−ai, t)] ≥ 0.
The result then follows from Lemma 1, which shows that m∗t (a) is increasing in
v(a, t).
Step 2 By continuity, there exists a neighborhood I ′ of t = 0 in which v(aij, t) >
v(aji, t). Meanwhile, combining Lemmas 1 and 2 shows that m
∗
t (a) is strictly
increasing in v(a, t) in the neighborhood I of t = 0. Intersecting these neigh-
borhoods gives the desired result, namely m∗t (aij) > m
∗
t (aji) for all t ∈ I ∩ I ′.
Part (ii): Combining the result of Part (i) and Lemma 3 gives the desired result.
B.3 Proofs of Section 4
B.3.1 Useful Lemmas
Lemma 4. For any given x = (f, σ), the optimal attention strategy of any voter t
uniquely exists. Let mt : Ω→ [0, 1] be as such, and let
mt = Ex [mt (ω˜)]
be the average probability that voter t chooses β under x. Then,
(i) if Ex [exp (νx (ω˜, t) /µ)] < 1, then mt = 0;
(ii) if Ex [exp (−νx (ω˜, t) /µ)] < 1, then mt = 1;
(iii) otherwise mt ∈ (0, 1) and for any ω:
mt (ω) =
Λt exp
(
νx(ω,t)
µ
)
Λt exp
(
νx(ω,t)
µ
)
+ 1
,
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where
Λt =
mt
1−mt
is the likelihood that voter t chooses β over α under x.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 1 and is thus omitted.
The next lemma is adapted from Milgrom (1981):
Lemma 5. Assume Assumption 4. Take any σ that is symmetric and non-degenerate,
and write x = (f, σ). Then Ex [h (a˜β) | ωβ = ω] is increasing (resp. strictly increasing)
in ω if the function h is increasing (resp. strictly increasing) in its argument.
Proof. See Milgrom (1981).
The next lemma generalizes Lemma 0 to encompass noisy news:
Lemma 6. Assume Assumptions 1-4. Take any σ that is symmetric and non-
degenerate, and write x = (f, σ). Then,
(i) νx (ωmn, t) ≥ νx (ωnm, t) ∀t and m > n;
(ii) for t = 0,
(a) νx (ωmn, 0) = −νx (ωnm, 0) ∀m, n;
(b) νx (ωmn, 0) > νx (ωnm, 0) ∀m > n;
(c) νx (ωK1, 0) = maxω νx (ω, 0).
Proof. Part (i): By symmetry,
νx (ωmn, t) = Ex [u (a˜β, t) | ωβ = ωn]− Ex [u (−a˜β, t) | ωβ = ωm] ,
and hence
νx (ωmn, t)− νx (ωnm, t) = Ex [u (a˜β, t) + u (−a˜β, t) | ωβ = ωn]
− Ex [u (a˜β, t) + u (−a˜β, t) | ωβ = ωm] ,
so the problem boils down to showing that the right-hand side of the above equality
is positive. To this end, notice that the term Ex [u (a˜β, t) + u (−a˜β, t) | ωβ = ω] is
decreasing in ω by Assumption 2 (ii) and Lemma 5.
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Part (ii): In the above derivation, using the fact that u(a, 0) = u(−a, 0) yields
νx (ωmn, 0) = Ex [u (a˜β, 0) | ωβ = ωn]− Ex [u (−a˜β, 0) | ωβ = ωm]
= Ex [u (a˜β, 0) | ωβ = ωn]− Ex [u (a˜β, 0) | ωβ = ωm] ,
where the term Ex [u (a˜β, 0) | ωβ = ω] is strictly decreasing in ω by Lemma 5 and
Assumption 2 (i). The remainder the proof is straightforward and is thus omitted.
The next lemma shows that garbling adds white noises to voters’ differential util-
ities from choosing one candidate over another:
Lemma 7. Fix any t, σ and f  f ′, and write x = (f, σ) and x′ = (f ′, σ). Then,
(i) for any ω′ ∈ Ω, there exist probability weights {pi (ω′,ω)}ω∈Ω such that
νx′(ω
′, t) =
∑
ω
pi (ω′,ω) νx (ω, t) .
(ii) Ex [νx (ω˜, t)] = Ex′ [νx (ω˜′, t)].
Proof. Let ρ be the Markov kernel. For all ω,ω′ ∈ Ω, define
pi (ω′,ω) =
Px (ω) ρ (ω′ | ω)∑
ω˜ Px (ω˜) ρ (ω′ | ω˜)
=
Px (ω) ρ (ω′ | ω)
Px′ (ω′)
, (B.4)
and notice that
∑
ω pi (ω
′,ω) = 1 for all ω′.
By definition,
Px′ (ω′) =
∑
ω,a∈supp(σ)
ρ (ω′ | ω) f (ω | a)σ(a) =
∑
ω
ρ (ω′ | ω)Px (ω) ,
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and
νx′ (ω
′, t) =Ex′ [v (a˜, t) | ω′]
=
∑
a∈supp(σ)
f ′ (ω′ | a)σ (a) v (a, t)∑
a∈supp(σ)
f ′ (ω′ | a)σ (a)
=
∑
a∈supp(σ)
∑
ω
ρ (ω′ | ω) f (ω | a)σ (a) v (a, t)∑
a∈supp(σ)
∑
ω
ρ (ω′ | ω) f (ω | a)σ (a)
=
∑
ω
ρ (ω′ | ω)Px (ω) νx (ω, t)∑
ω
ρ (ω′ | ω)Px (ω)
=
∑
ω
pi (ω′,ω) νx (ω, t) .
Thus,
Ex′ [νx′ (ω˜′, t)] =
∑
ω′
(∑
ω
pi (ω′,ω) νx (ω, t)
)
· Px′ (ω′)
=
∑
ω
νx (ω, t)Px (ω) ·
∑
ω′
ρ (ω′ | ω) = Ex [νx (ω˜, t)] ,
and this completes the proof.
The next lemma shows that garbling reduces the median voter’s differential utility
from choosing β over α upon hearing the most centrist report of the former and the
most extreme report of the latter:
Lemma 8. Assume Assumptions 1 and 2. Fix any σ and any f  f ′ that satisfy
Assumptions 3 and 4, and write x = (f, σ) and x′ = (f ′, σ). Then νx (ωK1, 0) ≥
νx′ (ωK1, 0) .
47
Proof. For all ω′,
νx′ (ω
′, 0) =
∑
ω
∑
a∈supp(σ)
v (a, 0) ρ (ω′ | ω) f (ω | a)σ(a)∑
ω
∑
a∈supp(σ)
ρ (ω′ | ω) f (ω | a)σ (a)
≤max
ω
∑
a∈supp(σ)
v (a, 0) f (ω | a)σ(a)∑
a∈supp(σ)
f (ω | a)σ (a)
= max
ω
νx (ω, 0)
=νx (ωK1, 0) .
where the last equality uses Lemma 6 (ii (c)). Maximizing the left-hand side of the
above inequality, we obtain
νx′(ωK1, 0) = max
ω′
νx′ (ω
′, t) ≤ νx (ωK1, 0) ,
and this completes the proof.
B.3.2 Proofs of Main Results
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 1 (i), replacing v (a, t)’s with νx (ω, t)’s and invoking
Lemmas 4 and 6 gives the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Fix any tuple [A,Σ] of any order N ≥ 2.
Part (i): Let f  f ′ be as described in Theorem 3, and write x = 〈f,A,Σ〉 and
x′ = 〈f ′,A,Σ〉. Normalize µ to one for ease and for this part only.
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By Lemma 7,
Ex′ [exp (νx′ (ω˜′, t))]
=
∑
ω′
Px′ (ω′) exp (νx′ (ω′, t))
=
∑
ω′
Px′ (ω′) exp
(∑
ω
pi (ω′,ω) νx(ω, t)
)
≤
∑
ω′,ω
Px′ (ω′)pi (ω′,ω) exp (νx(ω, t))
=
∑
ω
(∑
ω′
ρ(ω′ | ω)
)
Px (ω) exp (νx (ω, t))
=Ex [exp (νx (ω˜, t))] ,
and hence
Ex′ [exp (−νx′ (ω˜′, t))] ≤ Ex [exp (−νx (ω˜, t))] .
Combining these facts with Lemma 4 gives the desired result.
Part (ii): Let f ′′ be as described in Theorem 3, and write x′′ = 〈f ′′,A,Σ〉. As in
Section B.2, write
∆x′′,mn(t) = µ
−1νx′′ (ωmn, t) , (B.5)
and drop the notation of t in the case of t = 0.
By Assumption 2 (iii) and (iv),
Ex′′
[
exp
(
∆˜x′′,mn(t)
)]
≤ exp (κt/µ)Ex′′
[
exp
(
∆˜x′′,mn
)]
,
where the last term of the above inequality can be bounded above as follows:
Ex′′
[
exp
(
∆˜x′′,mn
)]
=
K∑
m=1
Px′′ (ωmm) exp (∆x′′,mm) +
K∑
m=1
m−1∑
n=1
Px′′ (ωmm) γ (∆x′′,mn)
≤
K∑
m=1
Px′′ (ωmm) · 1 + 1
2
(
1−
K∑
m=1
Px′′ (ωmm)
)
γ (∆x′′,K1) .
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Thus a necessary condition for Ex′′
[
exp
(
∆˜x′′,mn
)]
≥ 1 to hold true is
∆x′′,K1 ≥ γ−1
(
2
[
exp (κ|t|/µ)−∑Km=1 Px′′(ωmm)
1−∑Km=1 Px′′(ωmm)
])
. (B.6)
Two things are noteworthy. First, the right-hand side of Condition (B.6) is strictly
increasing in
∑K
m=1 Px′′(ωmm). Second,
K∑
m=1
Px′′ (ωmm) =
N∑
i,j=1
K∑
m=1
f (ωm | ai) f (ωm | aj)σij ≥
N∑
i,j=1
K∑
m=1
1
K
· 1
K
· σij = 1
K
,
where the inequality can be seen from solving the following optimization problem:
min
zm,z′m
K∑
m=1
zmz
′
m s.t. zm, z
′
m ≥ 0 ∀m and
K∑
m=1
zm =
K∑
m=1
z′m = 1,
which attains its minimum value at zm = z
′
m =
1
K
, m = 1, · · · , K. Thus Condition
(B.6) holds true only if
νx′′ (ωK1, 0) ≥ µγ−1
(
2
[
K exp (κ|t|/µ)− 1
K − 1
])
. (B.7)
To complete the proof, notice that the right-hand side of Condition (B.7) is inde-
pendent of x. By the result of Part (i), the inequality must be strict prior to garbling
in order for it to hold true after garbling, and we are done.
C Online Appendix (For Online Publication Only)
C.1 Costly Information Dissemination
In this section, suppose the dissemination of political information involves a content
provider that profits from voters’ eyeballs. By showing a signal ω˜t to voter t, the
content provider earns a revenue equal to the mutual information between ω˜t and
the voter’s optimal decision. To maximize revenue, the content provider simply sets
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ω˜t = a˜ for all t. The net profit is then∫
I (mt, σ) dF (t)− C,
where C > 0 represents the fixed operation cost.
Two situations can arise in this modified setting: (1) voters pay no attention and
act based on the prior, information dissemination is unprofitable and thus unachiev-
able, and candidates adopt their most preferred positions; (2) candidates and voters
act as in Section 2 and information dissemination incurs no loss, i.e.,∫
I (m∗t , σ
∗) dF (t) ≥ C. (NL)
Below we study the equilibria of the second kind.
For any probability matrix Σ, let H (Σ) denote the entropy of the policy profile
that is distributed according to Σ, and let E (Σ, µ) be the set of policy matrices that
can be attained in the symmetric equilibria of our interest:
E (Σ, µ) =
A : ∃W s.t.
[A,Σ] is W − IC
W is [A,Σ]− rationalizable
(NL)
 .
The next corollary is immediate:
Corollary 2. Assume Assumptions 1 and 2. Let Σ be any probability matrix of any
order N ≥ 2 for which the set E (Σ, 0) is non-empty, and let C be any real number in
(0, H (Σ)). As µ grows from zero to infinity, the set E (Σ, µ) satisfies the description
of EAt (Σ, µ) in Theorem 1.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1 and is thus omitted.
C.2 Noisy News: Effect of Marginal Attention Cost
In the model presented in Section 4, write the attention set of any voter t < 0
as At (Σ, f, µ) in order to make its dependence on µ explicit. The next corollary
generalizes Theorem 1 to encompass noisy news:
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Corollary 3. Assume Assumptions 1-4, and let Σ be any probability matrix of or-
der N ≥ 2 for which the set E (Σ, f) is non-empty. Take any t < 0 such that
ν〈f,A,Σ〉 (ω, t) > 0 for some A ∈ E (Σ, f) and ω ∈ Ω. As we increase µ from zero to
infinity, the set EAt (Σ, f, µ) satisfies the description of its equivalent in Theorem 1.
Proof. Since the set E (Σ, f) is invariant with µ, it suffices to prove the following: as
µ increases from zero to infinity,
(i) the set At (Σ, f, µ) shrinks;
(ii) the term min {u (a1, 0)− u (aN , 0) : A ∈ At (Σ, f, µ)} increases;
(iii) the above described objects do not always stay constant.
Part (i): The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 3 (i) and is thus omitted.
Part (ii): Take any policy matrix A of order N and write x = 〈f,A,Σ〉. In the deriva-
tion of Condition (B.6), using the fact that ∆N1 > ∆x (ωK1, 0) yields the following
necessary condition:
γ (∆N1) ≥ 2
[
K exp(κ|t|/µ)− 1
K − 1
]
.
The remainder of the proof is analogous to that of Lemma 3 (ii) and is thus omitted.
Part (iii): When µ is small, At (Σ, f, µ) 6= ∅ by the assumption that ν〈f,A,Σ〉 (ω, t) > 0
for some A ∈ E (Σ, f) and ω ∈ Ω. When µ is large,
Ex
[
exp
(
∆˜x,mn(t)
)]
≈ Ex
[
1 + ∆˜x,mn(t)
]
<︸︷︷︸
(1)
Ex
[
1 + ∆˜x,mn
]
=︸︷︷︸
(2)
1,
where (1) uses Assumption 2 (iii) and (2) Lemma 6. Thus At (Σ, f, µ) = ∅ in this
case, and this completes the proof.
C.3 Limited Commitment
In this section, suppose the winning candidate honors his policy proposal with prob-
ability η ∈ [0, 1] and adopts his most preferred position (assumed to be equal to his
type) otherwise. The parameter η captures the winner’s level of commitment power
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and is treated as exogenously given. The policy proposal, now regarded as a cam-
paign promise, serves a new role beyond what we have seen so far: it enables voters
to infer the winner’s type, which is useful in case the latter reneges and does what
pleases himself most.
In what follows, we restrict candidates to using pure symmetric strategies that
are strictly increasing in their types. We could alternatively consider mixed strategies
that satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property, whereby high type candidates are
more likely to propose high policies than do low type candidates. We choose not to
pursue this route for ease of analysis.
Let −tN < · · · < −t1 ≤ 0 ≤ t1 < · · · < tN denote the candidates’ types and
−aN < · · · < −a1 < 0 < a1 < · · · < aN their policy proposals. The integer N
is greater than one and is treated as exogenously given. For i, j = 1, · · · , N , write
tij = (−ti, tj), and define
v̂(aij, t) = ηv (aij, t) + (1− η)v (tij, t)
as voter t’s differential utility from choosing candidate β over candidate α under
policy profile aij. Let
û+ (ac, tc) = ηu+ (ac, tc) + (1− η)u+ (tc, tc)
and
û− (ac, t−c) = ηu− (ac, t−c) + (1− η)u− (tc, t−c)
be the utility of the winning and losing candidate of type tc and t−c, respectively,
when the winning policy is ac. In the formulation of Section 2, replacing v, u+ and u−
with v̂, û+ and û−, respectively, yields players’ value functions in the current setting.
Under the aforementioned restrictions, the probability matrix Σ is fully deter-
mined by the candidates’ type distribution and will thus be taken as exogenously
given. Let T be a square matrix of order N whose ijth entry is tij, and let A and
W be as in the baseline model. A tuple 〈A,W〉 can be attained in an equilibrium of
our interest if (1) A is incentive compatible for the candidates under W (hereinafter,
W-IC), and if (2) W is can be rationalized by optimal attention strategies under A
(hereinafter, A-rationalizable). These conditions can be obtained from limiting candi-
dates to adopting monotone pure symmetric strategies and treating Σ as exogenously
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given in Definitions 3 and 4.
For any µ > 0, define
Ê (µ) =
{
A : ∃W s.t. A is W − IC
W is A− rationalizable
}
as the set of policy matrices that can be attained in the equilibria of our interest, as
well as
Ât (µ) =
{
A : E[A,T,Σ]
[
exp
(
µ−1v̂ (a˜, t)
)] ≥ 1}
as the attention set of any voter t < 0. Taking intersection yields the set ÊAt(µ) of
policy matrices that captures the voter’s attention in the equilibria of our interest.
Armed with these definitions and notations, we now state the main result of this
section:
Corollary 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the set Ê (µ) is independent of µ and is
given by
Ê =
{
A : A is ŴN − IC
}
.
In the case it is non-empty, the set ÊAt (µ) satisfies the description of it equivalent
in Theorem 1 for any voter t < 0 such that v̂(a, t) > 0 for some a ∈ A ∈ Ê.
Proof. Straightforward algebra shows that the term v̂ (aij, t), which can be elaborated
as follows:
v̂ (aij, t) =η [u (aj, t) + u (−aj, t)− [u (ai, t) + u (−ai, t)]]
+ (1− η) [u (tj, t) + u (−tj, t)− [u (ti, t) + u (−ti, t)]] ,
shares the essential properties of its equivalent v (aij, t) in the baseline model. Replac-
ing the latter with the former in the proof of Theorem 1 gives the desired result.
The impact of limited commitment on equilibrium outcomes can be subtle. Below
we illustrate the main intuitions in an example:
Example 3. In Example 1, suppose the winning candidate honors his policy proposal
with probability η and reneges with probability 1 − η. Tedious but straightforward
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algebra shows that in this case, the attention set of voter−τ is defined by the following
inequality:
η · (a2 − a1) + (1− η) · (te − tc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
inference effect
≥ µγ−1 (4 exp(2τ/µ)− 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hurdle of indifference
.
On the right-hand side of this inequality is the same hurdle of indifference that
appeared in the baseline model. This term represents the hurdle that candidates
need to bypass in order to grab the voter’s attention, and it is this exact term that
generates the phenomenon of policy extremism we have seen so far. On the left-hand
side of this inequality is a new term called the inference effect. It serves as a powerful
motivator for the voter to stay attentive, hence inferences can be drawn in case the
winner reneges.
Consider two cases:
Case 1 µγ−1 (4 exp(2τ/µ)− 2) ≤ te−tc = 1/2. In this case, the inference effect itself
is strong enough to overcome the hurdle of indifference. As the commitment
power increases, the need for drawing inferences diminishes, and the logic behind
Theorem 1 kicks in, suggesting that greater policy differentials are needed for
arousing and attracting attention.
Case 2 µγ−1 (4 exp(2τ/µ)− 2) > te − tc = 1/2. In this case, the inference effect is
weak compared to the hurdle of indifference, and the opposite happens as we
increase the winner’s commitment power.
C.4 Multiple Issues
In this section, suppose a policy consists of two issues a and b (e.g., inflation and
unemployment, defense and economy), both taking values in Θ. The Pareto frontier
B (a), defined as a function of a, is strictly decreasing, strictly concave and smooth,
and it satisfies the Inada condition lima→−1 B′(a) = 0 and lima→1 B′(a) = −∞. There
is a continuum of voters and two candidates named a and b. Each player is either
pro-a or pro-b, depending on whether his preference weight on issue b, or type, belongs
to Θa = [−1, 0] or Θb = [0, 1]. The type distribution is the same as that of Section 2,
subject to minor relabeling. The utility functions u (a, b, t), u+ (a, b, t) and u− (a, b, t)
are strictly increasing and smooth in (a, b), with u being strictly concave in (a, b) and
satisfying the Spence-Mirrlees’ generalized single-crossing property:
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Assumption 5. u(a, b, t) is strictly concave in (a, b) for all t and −ua(a,b,t)
ub(a,b,t)
is strictly
increasing in t for all (a, b).
Under the above assumptions, each voter t’s indifference curve is tangent to the
Pareto frontier at a unique point (a◦(t),B (a◦(t))) defined by
ua (a
◦(t),B (a◦(t)))
ub (a◦(t),B (a◦(t))) + B
′ (a◦(t),B (a◦(t))) = 0,
and a◦(t) is strictly decreasing in t. In the case where the range of a◦, denoted by
a◦(Θ), coincides with Θ, each a ∈ Θ is associated with a unique type (a◦)−1 (a) of
voter whose indifference curve is tangent to the Pareto frontier at (a,B(a)).
Since utilities are increasing in both issues, it suffices to consider an augmented
economy featuring a single issue a and the following augmented utility functions:
û (a, t) = u (a,B(a), t), û+ (a, t) = u+ (a,B(a), t) and û− (a, t) = u− (a,B(a), t). The
resemblance between this economy and the baseline one is noteworthy:
Lemma 9. Under Assumption 5, the function û satisfies the following properties:
(i) û(·, t) is strictly increasing on [−1, a◦(t)] and is strictly decreasing on [a◦(t), 1]
for all t;
(ii) û(·, t) is strictly concave for all t;
(iii) û has strict increasing differences if uat ≥ 0 and ubt ≤ 0 and one of these
inequalities is strict.
Corollary 5. Theorem 1 holds true if the augmented economy satisfies Assumptions
1 and 2.
Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. Part (i): Differentiating û(a, t) with respect to a and using the fact that
ua (a
◦(t),B (a◦(t)) , t)
ub (a◦(t),B (a◦(t)) t) + B
′ (a◦(t)) = 0,
we obtain
d
da
û(a, t) = ua (a,B(a), t) + ub (a,B(a), t)B′(a),
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and hence
d
da
û(a, t)
∣∣∣∣
a=a◦(t)
= 0.
Meanwhile, since a◦(t) is decreasing in t and a◦(I) = I, it follows that for any a <
a◦(t), there exists t′ > t such that a◦ (t′) = a and hence
ua (a,B (a) , t′)
ub (a,B (a) , t′) + B
′ (a) = 0.
Therefore,
d
da
û(a, t)
∣∣∣∣
a<a◦(t)
= ua (a,B(a), t)− ub (a,B(a), t) ua (a,B (a) , t
′)
ub (a,B(a), t′)
= ub (a,B(a), t)
[
ua (a,B (a) , t)
ub (a,B(a), t) −
ua (a,B (a) , t′)
ub (a,B(a), t′)
]
> 0,
where the inequality follows from the assumption that ub > 0 and −uaub is strictly
increasing in t. The proof of d
da
û(a, t)
∣∣∣
a>a◦(t)
< 0 is analogous and is thus omitted.
Part (ii): Straightforward algebra shows that
d2
da2
û(a, t) =uaa (a,B(a), t) + [uab (a,B(a), t) + uba (a,B(a), t)]B′(a)
+ ubb (a,B(a), t) (B′(a))2 + ub (a,B(a), t)B′′(a)
= [1,B′(a)]
[
uaa uab
uba ubb
][
1
B′(a)
]
+ ub (a,B(a), t)B′′(a)
<0,
where the inequality follows from the assumption that u(a, b, t) is strictly concave in
(a, b) and B(a) is strictly concave in a.
Part (iii): Since
∂2û(a, t)
∂a∂t
= uat (a,B(a), t) + ubt (a,B(a), t)B′(a),
∂2û(a,t)
∂a∂t
> 0 if uat ≥ 0 and ubt ≤ 0 and one of these inequalities is strict.
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